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Abstract
Recently the artificial intelligence community has turned its attention to
the process of discovery and found that the history of science is a fertile
source for what Darden has called 'compiled hindsight.' Such hindsight
generates weak heuristics for discovery that do not guarantee that
discoveries will be made but do have proven worth in leading to
discoveries. Triangulation is one such heuristic that is grounded in
historical hindsight. I will explore this heuristic within the general
framework of the BACON, GLAUBER, STAHL, DALTON and SUTTON
programs. In triangulation different bases of information are compared in
an effort to identify gaps between the bases. Thus, assuming that the
bases of information are relevantly related, the gaps that are identified
should be good locations for discovery and robust hypotheses.
Introduction
Part of the fascination of the history of science rests in the accounts of
scientific discovery. The exuberant, triumphant stories of scientific
discovery give shape to our vision of scientific inquiry and substance to
the high status we accord it. However, as one begins to think about,
analyze and conceptualize the process of scientific inquiry, clouds of
suspicion gather. The triumphant stories are often stories of insight,
imagination, luck or other characteristics that seem opposed to the idea
that scientific inquiry is orderly, methodic and logical. Are scientific
discoveries works of genius unfettered by the dictates of logic and the
constraints of empirical research? Are scientific discoveries the results of
good fortune and not careful methodic analysis? If so -- if discovery
requires genius or good fortune -- and if one holds that scientific research
is the paradigm of methodic, critical, logical reasoning, then it appears
that discovery is not really a part of scientific research at all and is
certainly not it most distinguishing feature.
The tensions and oppositions of the foregoing considerations can lead to
a strict separation of the contexts of discovery and justification. Quickly
put, the distinction is a distinction between processes that give rise to new
Ideas and theories and processes that test proposed Ideas and theories.
Since it is only in testing ideas and theories that the dictates of logic and
the rules of empirical adequacy are appropriate, it is justification, and not
discovery, that is the hallmark of scientific inquiry.
If one accepts that the hallmark of scientific inquiry is its base in logic
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and standards of empirical adequacy, then if one wishes to claim that
scientific discovery is equally a part of and characteristic of that sort of
inquiry, then it must be made clear that it is possible for there to be a
logic of discovery and attempt to produce that logic.
HeurlsLlcs and the process of discovery
Heuristics are procedures that generate desired results some of the
time. Unlike algorithms, heuristics do not guarantee that a correct result
will be produced in finite time and space. More precisely, an algorithm is
a procedure composed of a finite, stepwlse sequence of instructions such
that (1) given the initially required information the procedure will be
completed in finite space and time, (2) no additional information or
creativity is required to carry out the instructions, and (3) the result of
the procedure is a correct result. This definition is clearly normative
owing to condition 3. This condition is added to prohibit consideration of
trivially algorithmic procedures. Heuristics differ from algorithms in that
the three condition do not apply in a categorical manner. Although
heuristics may often terminate with correct results in finite time and
space using only specified information, they need not always do so. The
strength of a heuristic is a function of its previous success and the
conditions under which it is used. Heuristics embody complied hLndsight
[1]. A heuristic is a strong heuristic when it has been highly successful in
the past and is being applied under appropriate conditions.
Discovery is a process that consists of generation and evaluation [4]. In
generation new ideas, hypotheses or theories are articulated or
constructed. In evaluation these hypotheses, ideas or theories are tested
for plausibility. Intuitively, plausibility differs from .justification in that
theses `judged plausible need not be .justified but all justified theses must
be plausible. The judgments of novelty in generation and plausibility in
evaluation are context dependent. For a certain body of information a
thesis may be novel and plausible, while for a different body of
information it may fail to be either. Understanding discovery as a process
combining generation and evaluation allows one to interpret scientific
inquiry as movement from the novel and plausible to the routine and
`justified.
If the notions of 'logic' and 'discovery" are understood to encompass
heuristics as well as algorithms and processes of generation and evaluation
as well as moments of insight, then it seems reasonable to believe that
there are logics of discovery. The reasonableness of this belief does not
entail that there is some unique logic of discovery. Rather it allows that
there may be several.
The artificial intelligence community has generated several programs
that embody logics of discovery. Langley et al. [3] have examined four
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particular families of programs: BACON, GLAUBER, STAHL and DALTON.
The BACON programs can be understood as generating plausible
quantitative laws. By generating a complete experimental combination of
the values of dependent and independent variables, and by attempting to
extract constants and mathematical relations, the program searches both
the space of data and the space of laws in an effort to find laws that
accurately summarize the data. The primary heuristics of the BACON
programs concern the identification of constants and linear relations. The
GLAUBER program can be understood as generating qualitative laws that
relate classes of facts. Its primary heuristics concern the formation of
classes that best summarize the relations between the predicates,
attributes and values of the data and specify the quantifiers (universal or
particular) that generate law-like claims. The STAHL program attempts to
specify the components of a compound by examining facts about reactions
and the substances present in them. The primary heuristics of this
program concern reduction, substitution and the identification of
components and compounds as being the same. The DALTON program
begins wlth data concerning reactions and the components of compounds
and attempts to formulate a model that explains the reaction. Its primary
heuristics concern the number of occurrences of atoms and compounds
and principles of conservation across reactions. Darden and Rada [2] have
devised the SUTTON program to capture the discovery of the chromosome
theory of heredity. Its primary heuristics concern part-whole relations,
identity and causal propagation.
Discovery programs that concern scientific reasoning clearly profit from
the compiled hindsight that can be extracted from the history of science.
Procedures that have proved valuable in the past can be converted into
heuristics that may be of value in the present. Each of the foregoing
discovery programs embodies procedures abstracted from the history of
science which are reformulated in terms of the such well understood
strategies as 'generate and test,' 'hill climbing' and 'means-ends analysis.'
Triangulation
The heuristics used in discovery programs are neither sufficiently
general to be used in all cases nor sufficiently mechanical to guarantee
results. Discovery heuristics are context sensitive; their strength varies
according to the context. Another heuristic that can be extracted from
the history of science turns these difficulties into virtues. Triangulation
allows for the the comparison and evaluation of different bases of
information with the goal of generating more coherent and robust
accounts of those bases. [5,6,7].
The heuristic of triangulation can be formulated as a group of related
rules concerning generation and evaluation.
287
I) If there is a pattern in domain A that closely matches a pattern
in domain B and the pattern of domain B is plausible,
then use the structure of the pattern in B to generate new
patterns in A.
2) If the domain A does not have a clearly defined pattern and there
is some domain B that contains concepts that closely match those
in A,
then use the structure of the pattern in B to generate new
patterns in A.
3) Ifa "result in domain A is generated in accord with I or 2, and
the result closely matches a result in domain B,
then accept the result as plausible.
4) If the plausible results of A closely match the plausible results of
B in both structure and concepts,
then unify the domains and evaluate all of the patterns of A
and B in the new domain.
5) If plausible results are generated in a domain formed in accord
with 4,
then attempt to justify the results.
6) If there are patterns that do not hold for domains formed in
accord with 4,
then identify the conditions under which the patterns do not
hold, make these conditions the antecedents of material
conditionals and evaluate.
Triangulation is clearly a weak heuristic. There is no guarantee that
the process will be successful in entering into the context of justification.
Triangulation can generate implausible results and it can generate results
that may be erroneous. However, triangulation makes good use of the
results of other heuristics used in differing contexts, and attempts to
bridge the gaps that could be created by applying other heuristics in a
particular domain without considering the results in other domains. It
does so by generating hypotheses in accord with both structural and
conceptual analogies (rules I, 2 and 3) derived from other contexts.
Further, triangulation amplifies the coherence of results by generating a
unified domain and generating new conditionalized hypotheses (rules 4, 5
and 6). The hypotheses generated in this manner serve to address two
criteria of plausibility not directly addressed by other heuristics. First
scientific hypotheses are often deemed plausible on the basis of analogies to
patterns in other more well understood domains. Second scientific
hypotheses often gain plausibility by unifying domains even when the
unification generates patterns that are more restrictive.
The heuristic of triangulation can be extended to provide a gateway to
reasonings that are even more extensible. In the foregoing rules only the
relation of unification has been considered. Other relations are possible.
Two domains may retain their autonomy and still be relevantly related.
Neighboring domains may force constraints on what is to be considered a
plausible hypothesis in a particular domain, or a new plausible and
288
justified result in a particular domain may force alteration in the
plausible patterns of other domains. By extending the heuristic of
triangulation to include such a gateway, discovery processes that are
neither data driven nor theory driven may be investigated.
Conclusion
It is reasonable to consider the context of discovery to be amenable to
rational analysis provided that the notion of logic is extended to include
heuristics and the notion of discovery is extended to include processes of
generation and evaluation. These extensions allow for the possibility of a
logic of discovery, but do not demonstrate that there is such. One way in
which it can be demonstrated that there is a logic of discovery is by
constructing programs that generate discoveries. Such programs have
been constructed. However, the heuristics of these programs focus
primarily upon the data in a single domain. The heuristic of triangulation
uses the patterns and results of one domain to generate and evaluate the
results of another domain. This heuristic focuses on the scientific values of
analogical support and increased coherence, and makes possible a gateway
to other forms of extensible reasoning. Thus, triangulation should prove to
be a valuable addition to the treasury of heuristics of discovery.
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